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The role of representatives of dominant shareholders with the sustainable development 
through corporate social responsibility matters
Abstract
In this paper, we analyse the effect that directors representing controlling shareholders have 
on corporate social responsibility (CSR) matters since these investors are the core 
shareholders in civil law countries, given their high presence on boards. Thus, we analyse the 
effect of institutional directors on CSR disclosure, but also the impact of the classification of 
these directors between pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional directors, 
depending on if they maintain only an investment relationship with the firm or both an 
investment and commercial link, respectively. We hypothesise a quadratic relationship 
between institutional directors and CSR disclosure. We show a curvilinear relationship 
between institutional directors/pressure-resistant directors and CSR reporting, suggesting that 
these directors may play two opposite roles (monitoring or entrenchment with managers). 
However, pressure-sensitive directors do not affect CSR disclosure. These findings indicate 
that there is an association between board members and strategic decisions. Moreover, our 
evidence shows that institutional directors do not act in an identical way. Finally, the 
enhancement of corporate governance depends on the proportion of institutional and pressure-
resistant directors on boards.
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Malpractice, corporate corruption or increasing pollution, among others, have led to 
the rise of CSR as an issue of considerable importance. Indeed, the market no longer only 
considers economic performance, but also examines social and environmental performance 
when evaluating companies (see Gunningham, 2009). Therefore, CSR has become a key 
strategic element.
Company’s features such as corporate governance may influence CSR. In this sense, 
past literature has analysed the relationship between board characteristics and CSR 
(Galbreath, 2016; Jizi, 2017). However, prior research on CSR has paid scarce attention to the 
role of directors appointed by institutional investors (hereinafter institutional directors).
Institutional investors are the most important controlling shareholders in Europe 
(Brossard et al., 2013), due to the particular agency problems, where minority shareholders’ 
wealth is appropriated by controlling shareholders and, therefore, they perform an important 
role on boards as directors. According to prior evidence, institutional directors have an effect 
on board compensation (López-Iturriaga et al., 2015) or financial reporting quality (Pucheta-
Martínez and García-Meca, 2014), among others.
Boards of directors play a relevant role in corporate governance, affecting CSR 
practices (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013). Therefore, given the role performed by institutional 
directors on boards and the relevance of CSR issues to boards’ daily business, it is necessary 
to gain an understanding of whether institutional directors have an effect on CSR. 
Accordingly, this research aims at investigating the association between institutional directors 
and CSR reporting. Furthermore, previous evidence suggests that the kind of business 
relations between institutional investors and companies (Brickley et al., 1988) can explain 
why their abilities, incentives and aims to engage in corporate governance may be different 
(Almazán et al., 2005). Thus, we also distinguish between pressure-sensitive directors, who 
represent institutional investors maintaining business relations with the firm on the board 
where they serve, and pressure-resistant directors, who represent institutional investors who 
do not maintain such relations and, therefore, the repercussion of these two categories of 
directors is also examined. 
This research makes some contributions to the literature on the role of institutional 
directors in corporate governance. Our evidence shows a link between the mechanisms of 
corporate governance and strategic decisions. Specifically, we provide evidence that 
institutional directorship is associated with CSR disclosure, exerting an effect that is 
complicated to show in UK and US environments because this kind of directors is less 
common on their boards. Consistent with prior evidence (e.g., Almazán et al., 2005), our 
results display that institutional directorship has not to be considered as a whole as these 
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directors participate in corporate governance in dissimilar ways. Thus, when a distinction is 
made between pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive directors, the evidence shows that 
their attitudes concerning CSR reporting are different: whereas pressure-resistant directors 
affect CSR disclosure, pressure-sensitive directors do not. The results also show that 
institutional directors as a whole and pressure-resistant directors may perform two opposite 
roles, depending on their representation on boards. Thus, when their representation is low, the 
entrenchment/collusion hypothesis prevails as they are negatively associated with CSR 
reporting. However, when their representation on boards exceeds a critical point, they support 
CSR initiatives as the monitoring hypothesis prevails and their monitoring role becomes more 
active and efficient, given that they encourage managers to disclose CSR information. This 
evidence suggests that the relationship between institutional/pressure-resistant directors and 
CSR disclosure is quadratic (U-shaped). Finally, we have constructed an index which includes 
economic, social and environmental matters that can be used to assess to what extent a 
company provides CSR information.
The next section explores the institutional setting within which this paper is situated. 
In the third section, the theoretical background and hypotheses are described. Then, the 
research design and results are described. Finally, the discussions and conclusions are 
displayed.
Spanish context
The promotion of CSR in the Spanish business sector has been provided by the 
Spanish civil society (Spanish Government, 2014). Spanish multinationals occupy the top 
positions in international rankings of CSR and sustainability, making Spain the European 
country with a greater number of multinationals in these rankings (European Commission, 
2013). 
Spain has driven some initiatives to promote and perform CSR properly, in line with 
Europe (Steurere, 2011). In this regard, Spain published a White Paper and created the State 
Council of Corporate Social Responsibility. In 2011, the Spanish Government enacted a 
sustainable economy law to turn the Spanish productive model into something more 
competitive and environmentally and socially sustainable. The Conthe Code (CUBG) was 
updated in 2015; this proposes the incorporation of CSR practices in businesses. And in 2002, 
the Spanish Accounting Standard Setting Board published its White Paper for the Reform of 
Accounting in Spain, according to which firms have to include in their annual reports 
environmental information on a compulsory basis and social information on a voluntary basis. 
Corporate governance is essential to undertake and ensure the proper development of 
CSR (European Commission, 2013). Spain has a non-market-based system, but one that is 
oriented to a banking system. Thus, banks play an important role in economic and business 
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development. Therefore, the corporate control market is not very common. Moreover, 
Spanish corporate governance is distinguished by a high ownership concentration, which 
leads to the presence of controlling shareholders and allows them to play a major role on 
boards and influence managers. Among controlling shareholders, the position of institutional 
investors in Spain is noteworthy and their impact on corporate governance is significant. The 
level of shareholder protection is low. As a result, the board of directors is one of the most 
important mechanisms for alleviating agency costs characterized by the expropriation of 
minority shareholders’ wealth by controlling shareholders.
Consequently, the analysis of the effect of institutional directors on CSR in the 
Spanish context is important as the board is one of the main bodies making decisions and 
mitigating agency problems. Thus, given the importance that CSR has acquired in Spain for 
sustainable development, it is essential to examine such relationships. In addition, in 
examining institutional investors, most prior research has focused on their roles as 
shareholders and not as directors and the majority of the previous literature on CSR has been 
based on the US and UK (Miras-Rodríguez et al., 2014).
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
According to stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984), companies should not only consider 
owners’ interests, but also those of all stakeholders as they can influence or can be influenced 
by the company. Thus, the relationships between managers and decisive stakeholders are 
essential in creating sustainable long-term value. The triple bottom line (TBL), based on 
stakeholder theory, offers a wider view of the stakeholders affected by firms. This framework 
has been adopted by many companies to evaluate their performance from a broader 
perspective and, thus, create greater business value. Accordingly, the three components that 
make up the TBL – social, environmental and financial – are considered to assess firm 
performance. Thus, this approach adds social and environmental measures of performance 
and, therefore, companies are not only responsible for economic aspects. Consequently, the 
ultimate goal of firms is not to generate wealth for their shareholders, but also to create social 
and environmental value, extending the benefits not only to shareholders, but also to all 
stakeholders. 
Firms can gain competitive advantage and greater financial benefits through engaging 
in CSR activities (e.g., Jung et al., 2017, Martínez-Ferrero and Frías-Aceituno, 2015). Thus, 
CSR is part of the corporate strategy (Manescu, 2011) for developing competitive advantage 
and is considered a strategic investment. Consequently, boards are increasingly making 
decisions concerning CSR. Hence, boards not only have to focus on economic performance, 
but have to extend their aims and consider social and environmental performance as well, 
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creating value for stakeholders and being responsible towards them and not only towards 
owners.
Boards exert significant influence on the responsible behaviour of firms. Thus, board 
composition may play an essential role in CSR policies. Some authors (e.g., Pucheta-Martínez 
and García-Meca, 2014) suggest that corporate governance is enhanced by institutional 
directors.
Some theories suggest a positive impact of institutional directors on CSR practices. 
Among these, stewardship theory is frequently used to understand the implications of the 
presence of institutional directors for company strategy as it stresses the experience, 
knowledge, and skill of directors. The rising belief that CSR activities enhance financial 
performance has put social and environmental issues on firms’ agenda. Hence, institutional 
directors are expected to foster CSR practices because they focus on social and environmental 
issues as well as financial performance. In addition, they are interested in showing the 
responsible behaviour of the company as otherwise their professional reputation can be 
harmed (Pathan, 2009). Stakeholder power theory shows that firms are likely to meet the 
requests of stakeholders who control critical resources (Ullman, 1985). Therefore, outside 
directors, such as institutional directors, may be more aware of CSR activities than 
executives, who are more concerned with economic questions. According to resource 
dependence theory, the board of directors is a necessary body to manage outside 
dependencies, such as those imposed by social and environmental challenges. This theory 
suggests that outside directors, such as institutional directors, are an effective tool to connect 
the firm with its external environment. Finally, agency theory posits that institutional directors 
who are committed to CSR issues may strengthen the internal control of firms. Therefore, 
they may reduce opportunistic behaviour problems due to asymmetric information (Frias-
Aceituno et al., 2013), disclosing social and environmental information.
According to myopic institutional theory (Hansen and Hill, 1991), institutional 
investors tend to be short-sighted and focus on returns. This is in line with the thesis that 
institutional investors will not support CSR investment decisions, given the long-term 
horizons and uncertain results associated with them (Coffey and Fryxell, 1991). However, 
institutional investors usually own a large proportion of shares, making it complicated and 
costly to sell off their shares without negatively affecting the stock price. Furthermore, 
institutional investors hold stock in most companies and, consequently, may have difficulty in 
finding other suitable investments. Accordingly, institutional directors have sufficient 
incentives to perform monitoring activities, which implies both collecting and analysing 
information and influencing management, as well as being involved in the strategic decisions 
of firms such as CSR decisions.
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In addition, Spicer (1978) suggests that institutional directors consider firms which do 
not behave responsibly to be riskier (Scholtens and Zhou, 2008) and potentially less efficient. 
Moreover, these directors view CSR as essential to attain sustainability and competitive 
advantage (Neubaum and Zahra, 2006), as in changing and unpredictable environments 
socially responsible behaviour can help firms gain legitimacy through support from different 
stakeholders. Thus, institutional directors are likely to support CSR activities because they are 
necessary for long-term value creation (Mahapatra, 1984). In this line, previous research 
shows a positive impact of institutional investors on CSR practices, demonstrating the 
effectiveness of these owners in promoting responsible behaviour (e.g. Dyck et al., 2015).
However, although institutional directors are active and vigilant investors and, 
therefore, may encourage CSR activities (Useem, 1996), monitoring is extremely costly. The 
cost of monitoring activities is borne by institutional investors and all stakeholders benefit 
from them. Consequently, institutional directors have to determine the benefit–cost ratio of 
monitoring activities and the intensity of monitoring will vary depending on the value of this 
ratio (Almazán et al., 2005). Additionally, institutional directors have the power to make 
decisions based on their own benefits, (Ruiz-Mallorquí and Santana-Martín, 2009) and tend to 
deal personally with firms to achieve their own goals (Carleton et al., 1998). Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to suggest that institutional directors may participate in tunnelling activities, 
namely expropriating wealth from minority owners (Johnson et al., 2000), instead of 
performing control activities. Therefore, institutional directors may negatively influence CSR 
activities (Arora and Dhawadkar, 2011) despite the potential for CSR practices to increase 
firm performance, as they may hope to derive lower profits due to the wedge between cash 
flow and control rights. 
Previous literature finds a linear relationship between institutional directors and CSR. 
However, Jara-Bertin et al. (2012) and Zou (2010) show a quadratic non-linear association 
between institutional investors and firm performance. This relationship is supported by the 
theory of optimal distinctiveness (Brewer 1991). Accordingly, the effect of a collective is 
expected to be non-linear: the presence of features (institutional directors) at very low and 
very high levels within a team (board of directors) can lead to more positive results (more 
CSR practices), while more negative outcomes (fewer CSR practices) can take arise when 
there is a balanced proportion of features (a U-shaped relationship). These views are also 
supported by social identity approach. Therefore, focusing on these arguments, it can be 
suggested that institutional directors not only have a linear effect on CSR practices, but also a 
non-linear effect. Therefore, we extend this quadratic relationship to institutional directors 
and CSR practices.
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Thus, we hypothesize that as the proportion of institutional directors increases, they 
will prefer to collude and entrench with managers to obtain private benefits, given the high 
costs of both monitoring and challenging the management team to adopt CSR activities; 
consequently, they will align with managers’ decisions rather than supporting CSR practices. 
Institutional directors will be less likely to wish to bear more monitoring costs and, as a result, 
they will have fewer incentives to push managers to perform CSR activities. When their 
presence on boards is increasing, it is easier for them to collude with managers. In this line, 
Oh et al. (2011) report that executives have a negative impact on CSR practices, showing that 
managers are more interested in financial performance than CSR activities. This is because 
managers may perceive CSR activities as an extra cost and consider that they do not create 
firm value. Accordingly, managers may deal with institutional directors to obtain their support 
and, in exchange, institutional directors may fulfill their own aims. Furthermore, more than 
50% of board members do not perceive CSR to be a key issue (Ricart et al. 2005) and the 
views of a low proportion of institutional directors wishing to promote CSR policies may, 
therefore, not be considered. 
Nevertheless, when their presence on boards reaches a certain threshold, institutional 
directors may have a positive effect on CSR activities, in line with the monitoring hypothesis. 
Thus, the addition of more institutional directors on boards above this inflection point will 
concentrate a higher proportion of institutional directors, who may share monitoring costs. 
Their monitoring role will, therefore, be more efficient and it will be more difficult for 
managers to collude with all institutional directors. Moreover, the presence of more 
institutional directors on boards will militate against other institutional directors taking part in 
tunnelling activities. Accordingly, it is more likely that institutional directors will perform 
monitoring activities, avoid expropriation activities and challenge boards and management 
team to implement CSR strategies, viewing the benefits of CSR as essential to achieve 
competitive advantage, which leads to the long-term sustainability of the firm and enhances 
firm value. Therefore, there can be two opposite impacts on CSR from the presence of 
institutional directors, suggesting a U-shaped relationship between them and CSR practices. 
Based on the above, we posit the following hypothesis:
H1: Institutional directors have a negative effect on CSR reporting, but when they 
exceed a critical point, they affect them positively. 
However, institutional directors do not behave in a monolithic manner with regard to 
corporate issues (e.g., Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Business relationships are considered as a 
key factor that may influence the effectiveness of control by institutional directors, affecting 
their capability to perform monitoring activities and the extent of their influence (Brickley et 
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al., 1988). Accordingly, institutional directors can be categorized as either pressure-resistant 
institutional directors or pressure-sensitive institutional directors (e.g. Almazán et al., 2005).
Pressure-resistant directors, including mutual funds, pension funds, investment funds, 
venture capital firms, and endowments, do not incur conflicts of interest arising from business 
ties and the pressure from the company in which they invest is lower and, consequently, they 
can behave more independently. Hence, pressure-resistant directors may be more active in 
monitoring and may exert pressure to encourage change (Pucheta-Martínez and García-Meca, 
2014), such as engaging in CSR practices. Moreover, these directors prefer to invest over a 
long-term horizon (Tihanyi et al., 2003) and to reduce agency problems, performing 
monitoring activities to mitigate fraudulent behaviour. Thus, they will be more active in 
monitoring managers and may affect firm decisions in line with stakeholders’ interests, 
supporting CSR activities and increasing the disclosure of environmental and social issues. 
So, some authors evidence a positive relationship between pressure-resistant institutional 
ownership and CSR (e.g., Harjoto and Jo 2008).
However, Jiao and Ye (2013) show a quadratic relationship between pressure-resistant 
directors and firms’ future performance. Consequently, we extend this non-linear relationship 
to pressure-resistant directors and CSR practices. Therefore, we propose that when the 
presence of pressure-resistant institutional directors goes from low to medium levels, their 
position may not be considered when trying to enhance CSR practices as most of the board 
members do not consider CSR an essential matter (Ricart et al., 2005). Furthermore, their 
incentives to perform monitoring activities will be lower because they bear more monitoring 
costs and, as a result, they will be less likely to challenge managers to undertake CSR 
activities. In addition, it is also more likely that pressure-resistant directors will take part in 
tunnelling activities because executives may collude with them to obtain their support; in 
exchange, these directors may achieve fulfillment of their own interests. Conversely, as the 
proportion of pressure-resistant directors grows from medium to high levels, they may 
monitor management team more effectively as they can share monitoring costs. When their 
presence on boards reaches a certain point, it will be more difficult for managers to attain the 
support of pressure-resistant directors. Thus, the greater the presence of pressure-resistant 
directors on the board the more likely it is that they will perform monitoring activities, 
militating against other pressure-resistant directors taking part in expropriation activities and 
challenging boards to implement a CSR strategy. These arguments support a U-shaped 
relationship between pressure-resistant directors and CSR practices. 
On the other hand, pressure-sensitive investors include banks and insurance 
companies. These, particularly banks, are entities with high public visibility (Khan, 2010). 
They can act as creditors and shareholders and, as a result, society may press these investors 
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to increase CSR activities in the firms in which their representatives serve on boards to avoid 
unsafe products or polluting the environment. Accordingly, pressure-sensitive investors have 
directed their activities towards engaging in socially responsible behaviour to meet the 
expectations of a wider group of stakeholders. In this line, banks have increased their CSR 
activities (Sharif and Rashid, 2014). 
Moreover, banks perform a triple role, as shareholders, creditors and directors. This 
position gives them more information, reduces information asymmetry and makes them more 
efficient monitors as their knowledge of the firms, obtained through their relationships, allows 
pressure-sensitive directors to supervise firms’ investments and mitigate adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems. Furthermore, pressure-sensitive directors may also act as creditors 
and, therefore, they may be interested primarily in the viability of the company and paying off 
debt. Thus, pressure-sensitive directors may support CSR activities as they can improve 
internal control systems, enable better decision making and save costs, resulting in lower firm 
risk. In this way, increasing CSR activities will allow pressure-sensitive investors to lessen 
the risk faced by lenders and to lower the probability of default, thereby protecting their loans.
In addition, banks reduce their opportunistic behaviour when they behave as both 
shareholders and creditors (DeAndrés-Alonso et al., 2010). Consequently, pressure-sensitive 
directors may play an active and effective monitoring role and will tend to align their 
representatives’ interests with those of other shareholders, trying to guarantee management 
involvement in CSR. However, Morck et al. (2000) show a non-linear association between 
pressure-sensitive institutional ownership and corporate performance. Therefore, we extend 
this non-linear association to pressure-sensitive directors and CSR.
Drawing on the above arguments, we predict that as the presence of pressure-sensitive 
directors on boards increases, they will challenge boards and managers to undertake CSR 
activities as their monitoring role may be more active and effective than that of other 
directors, due to their triple role as shareholders, creditors and directors. Moreover, CSR 
reporting may be promoted by pressure-sensitive directors because they tend to consider not 
only their own interests, but also those of other stakeholders. However, when their presence 
on boards reaches a tipping point, the incorporation of more pressure-sensitive directors will 
result in them playing a less effective and weaker monitoring role due to their commercial ties 
(Brickley et al., 1988). This will, then, affect corporate decisions as each pressure-sensitive 
investor will tend to enforce their own interests at the expense of other pressure-sensitive 
investors; their aim will not be to boost corporate value, but to obtain private profits. 
Consequently, pressure-sensitive directors will be likely to give more support to managers 
and less willing to challenge them with regard to CSR practices, due to the interest disputes 
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pressure-sensitive institutional investors have to contend with arising from their commercial 
ties (Almazán et al., 2005). Otherwise, they may compromise their business relations.
Additionally, the monitoring costs are higher for pressure-sensitive than for pressure-
resistant directors (Almazán et al., 2005) and, therefore, when the presence of pressure-
sensitive directors is high, they may not have the incentives and abilities to control managers; 
if they do so, they might endanger their opportunities to obtain private benefits in favour of 
other pressure-sensitive directors who support managers’ decisions. Hence, pressure-sensitive 
directors may choose to favour their decisions (Brickley et al., 1988), for example limiting 
CSR activities. This would be in line with research which has shown that when pressure-
sensitive directors make corporate decisions, they are contrary to shareholders’ interests (e.g., 
Tribó and Casasola, 2010). Thus, pressure-sensitive directors might collude with managers, 
supporting their decisions, such as not being involved in CSR practices, to attain their own 
aims and avoid jeopardizing business ties. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize an inverted U-shaped relationship between pressure-
sensitive directors and CSR activities: as the proportion of pressure-sensitive directors 
increases on boards, they will perform an active monitoring role to avoid negative and 
opportunistic disclosures and will support those that benefit a broad range of stakeholders, for 
example, supporting CSR reporting. Nevertheless, given the monitoring costs and the 
conflicts of interest, when their presence exceeds a critical point, their aim might be to collude 
with managers and to support managers’ decisions, such as reducing CSR activities to obtain 
private benefits. In return, managers will provide benefits to those pressure-sensitive directors 
who do not hinder their decisions, such as limiting CSR.
Thus, according to the above views, we propose the following hypotheses:
H2a: Pressure-resistant directors have a negative effect on CSR reporting, but when 
they reach a critical point, they affect it positively. 
H2b: Pressure-sensitive directors have a positive effect on CSR reporting, but when 
they reach a critical point, they affect it negatively.
RESEARCH DESIGN
Sample
The database used in this research was drawn from the population of Spanish non-
financial listed companies for the period 2007–2014. Both financial and insurance firms were 
removed from the sample due to their particular accounting practices, which make their 
financial statements incomparable with those of firms in other sectors. An unbalanced panel, 
consisting of 864 firm-year observations, was constructed. The findings provided for such 
panels are as reliable as those achieved by balanced panels (Arellano, 2003).
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Financial data were collected from the “Sistema de Análisis de Balances Ibéricos” 
(SABI database) and corporate governance information was obtained from the annual 
corporate governance reports. Finally, CSR data were collected from both the companies’ 
websites and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 
Variables
Two different dependent variables are used. REPORT, measured as a dummy variable 
coded 1 if the company discloses a CSR report and 0, otherwise (Frias-Aceituno et al., 2013). 
The second one is defined as CSR_REPORTING. To measure this variable, we built a CSR 
index based on the triple bottom line approach, which includes economic, social and 
environmental performance (Gallego, 2006). This index was constructed through content 
analysis of the CSR reports (Frías-Aceituno et al., 2013). Specifically, we used an aggregate 
construct calculated as the aggregation of 25 items measured as dummy variables, assigning 
each item the value 1 if the firm provides information concerning the item considered and 0, 
otherwise (Miras-Rodríguez, 2014). The selection of the 25 items was focused on 
investigations conducted in Spain (e.g., Gallego, 2006) as our study is also based on this 
context and, therefore, both the legal and cultural environments should be taken into account; 
they influence CSR practices and CSR disclosure (Cuadrado-Ballesteros et al., 2015). The 
CSR_REPORTING value for each company is estimated as follows in Table 1: 
CSR_REPORTING it=∑item points it/total points (25 points)
 [Insert Table 1 about here]
The CSR_REPORTING variable is in the range (0–1), based on the following 
classification shown in Table 2:
[Insert Table 2 about here]
To test how institutional directors influence CSR_REPORTING, several independent 
variables are used. The variable PINST represents institutional directors on boards measured 
as the proportion of institutional directors on boards. The variables PSENSIT and PRESIST 
represent the proportion of pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant directors on boards, 
respectively. Both PSENSIT and PRESIST are the quotient of the total number of pressure-
sensitive/pressure-resistant directors on boards, respectively, and the total number of members 
on boards. Finally, the squares of these variables (PINST2; PSENSIT2; PRESIST2) are used to 
analyse whether these directors affect CSR in a quadratic manner. 
Other factors may have an effect on CSR_REPORTING and, therefore, several 
variables have been considered. Firm size is defined as FSIZE and measured as the log of 
total assets. Firm performance is defined as ROA and measured as operating income before 
interest and taxes over total assets. Leverage is defined as LEV and measured as the ratio 
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between the volume of the firm’s short- and long-term debt and its total assets (Fernández-
Gago et al., 2014). Board size is defined as BDSIZE and measured as the number of directors 
on boards. Board independence is labelled as INDP and calculated as the proportion of 
independent directors on boards. A dual position as CEO and president of the board of 
directors is defined as CEO_DUALITY. This variable is calculated as a binary variable coded 
1 if the CEO serves as CEO and chairman of the board and 0, otherwise. Board activity is 
defined as BDMEET and measured as the number of meetings held by the board. Finally, the 
sector to which the company belongs is also considered. The sector will affect CSR activities 
(Fernández-Gago et al., 2014) and the companies that belong to highly sensitive sectors are 
more likely to disclose CSR information (Deegan and Gordon, 1996). Thus – and according 
to the Spanish Stock Exchange sector classification – we use three sector variables, defined as 
SECT_OE, SECT_IC and SECT_CO and measured as a dummy variable coded 1 if the 
company belongs to the oil and energy sector, the basic materials, industry and construction 
sector and the consumer services sector respectively and 0, otherwise. Year and firm fixed 




Table 3 displays the mean and median values, the standard deviation and the 10th and 
90th percentiles.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The results show that the 47.5% of the firms provide CSR reports, while the value of 
CSR_REPORTING is 0.31 out of 1, demonstrating that the CSR disclosure of firms is 
moderate. Regarding economic data, on average, firms present a size of 13.05 (log. of total 
assets expressed in Euros), negative profitability (-1.31%) and debt of 57.56%. The board of 
directors, on average, consists of 10 members; independent directors represent 33.19% and 
institutional directors account for 45.03%. The percentages of pressure-sensitive and pressure-
resistant directors are 7.72% and 36.89%, respectively. The board meets, on average, 9.7 
times per year. Moreover, the same person holds the position of CEO and board president in 
32% of companies. Finally, 7.74% of firms belong to the oil and energy sector, 26.52% of 




To examine for multicollinearity problems, Spearman’s correlation matrix was 
calculated. The values, not provided for the sake of brevity, show that the correlation 
coefficients are not high enough (> 0.8) to trigger multicollinearity issues (García-Meca and 
Pucheta-Martínez, 2015), except for the pair PINST–PRESIST, which has a value of 0.825. 
However, these variables are not simultaneously incorporated in the model. Accordingly, the 
models employed do not exhibit multicollinearity problems. 
Tables 4 and 5 display the findings of the baseline model for institutional, pressure-
sensitive and pressure-resistant directors. Table 4 provides the results for the dependent 
variable REPORT and Table 5 reports the findings for the dependent variable 
CSR_REPORTING. 
 [Insert Table 4 about here]
[Insert Table 5 about here]
According to model 1 in Table 4 and model 4 in Table 5, the variables PINST and 
PINST2 show that the presence of institutional directors on boards presents the expected signs 
(negative and positive, respectively) in a linear and quadratic way and the values are 
statistically significant in both models. Therefore, H1 cannot be rejected. The results find that 
as the number of institutional directors on boards increases, there will be a negative effect on 
CSR reporting, but when they reach a turning point, this situation will be inverted and the 
addition of new institutional members on boards beyond this tipping point will positively 
affect CSR disclosure. Accordingly, two opposite roles may be performed by institutional 
directors. When their presence on boards goes from low to intermediate levels, the collusion 
hypothesis predominates and they prefer to support executives’ decisions, such as reducing 
CSR reporting, but from intermediate to high levels of representativeness of these directors on 
boards, above a critical point, the monitoring hypothesis prevails and they challenge the 
executive team to undertake CSR reporting. These results are in line with previous research 
demonstrating these two opposite roles (e.g. Jara-Bertín et al., 2012; Zou, 2010). Therefore, 
there is evidence of a U-shaped relationship between institutional directors and CSR 
disclosure, consistent with Hu and Izumida (2008), who find this relationship between 
dominant shareholders (such as institutional investors) and corporate performance, as CSR is 
essential to create organizational value (Mahapatra, 1984).
Regarding pressure-sensitive directors, both the PSENSIT and PSENSIT2 variables 
exhibit the expected signs for both dependent variables, reported in model 2 and 5 in Table 4 
and 5, respectively, but the results are not statically significant in either model. Consequently, 
H2b has to be rejected. Hence, the presence of pressure-sensitive directors on boards does not 
influence CSR disclosure. These findings are consistent with previous research showing that 
pressure-sensitive directors do not affect CSR (e.g. Johnson and Greening, 1999; Neubaum 
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and Zahra, 2006; Oh et al., 2011). This result could be due to the lack of interest of pressure-
sensitive directors on strategic issues such as CSR, since controlling CSR practices is a long-
term activity (Johnson and Greening, 1999) and they might prefer to be involved in activities 
that increase short-term earnings. Additionally – and given that they represent institutional 
investors who maintain commercial ties with the firm in which they hold a directorship on 
boards – they may prefer to obtain private benefits by supporting other executives’ decisions, 
for example increasing executives’ compensation (López-Iturriaga et al., 2015), rather than 
strategic decisions, such as CSR disclosure or practices.
The variables PRESIST and PRESIST2 also present the expected signs (negative and 
positive respectively) for both dependent variables, as shown in model 3 in Table 4 and in 
model 6 in Table 5 and these are statistically significant. Therefore, H2a cannot be rejected. 
These findings display a U-shaped association between the presence of pressure-resistant 
directors on boards and CSR reporting. Particularly, these findings show that pressure-
resistant directors collude with executive teams (collusion hypothesis) when their presence on 
boards goes from low to medium levels and they may support their decisions, for example, 
lowering CSR initiatives. However, when they reach a certain point in terms of increased 
presence, they perform a monitoring role more effectively, mitigating the potential for other 
pressure-resistant directors to take part in tunnelling activities (contest hypothesis) and 
challenging boards and managers to engage in CSR activities, as these are essential to boost 
company performance. These results are in line with Jiao and Ye (2013), who also argue that 
these two opposite roles are played by pressure-resistant directors in analysing the association 
between pressure-resistant directors and company value. 
Regarding the control variables, the variables that represent the sector exhibit the 
expected signs (positive) in all models and they are statistically significant. BDSIZE is also 
statistically significant and has a positive impact on CSR, demonstrating that larger boards 
support CSR reporting. BDMEET is statistically significant, but the number of meetings held 
by the board has a negative effect on CSR reporting. The variables ROA and LEV exhibit the 
expected signs (positive and negative, respectively), but they are not statistically significant. 
These findings show that these two variables do not influence CSR disclosure, in line with 
Cuadrado-Balleteros at al., (2015) and Frias-Aceituno et al. (2013). The findings obtained for 
the other control variables should be considered with caution. FSIZE influences CSR 
disclosure positively and it is statistically significant except in models 2 and 5. 
CEO_DUALITY exhibits the expected sign (negative) and it is statistically significant, except 
in models 2 and 5. Finally, the variable INDP does not have an effect on CSR reporting 
(models 1, 3, 4 and 6), but INDP has a positive effect on CSR activities when the presence of 
pressure-sensitive directors is considered (models 2 y 5).
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Finally, we also take into account possible endogeneity problems between 
institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant directors and CSR disclosure as they 
may emerge in studies such as this. Namely, we wonder if these directors have a 
positive/negative effect on CSR reporting, or if firms with CSR reporting attract institutional, 
pressure-sensitive, or pressure-resistant directors to their boards. Causality usually goes from 
these directors to CSR disclosure, but it is also possible that CSR disclosure may affect board 
structure. Accordingly, we address this matter by lagging our independent and explanatory 
variables in our regressions in line with Hartzell and Sarks (2003), who support the use of 
lagged explanatory variables to alleviate possible endogeneity concerns. The findings, 
unreported for the sake of brevity, are consistent with the core findings provided earlier and, 
thus, we can confirm that potential endogeneity is not a concern in our analysis. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Given the great importance that CSR is acquiring as a strategic element, boards of 
directors are increasingly considering CSR issues. Thus, our aim is to explore whether 
directors who represent institutional ownership impact on CSR reporting, as they are the most 
important controlling shareholders in Europe, and corporate governance is a key issue in 
developing CSR. We also distinguish between pressure-resistant directors, who are appointed 
by institutional investors who only maintain an investment tie with the firm, and pressure-
sensitive directors, who are appointed by institutional ownership who maintain both a 
commercial and investment relation with the firm.
The results show the influence that institutional investors exert when they are 
directors. Specifically, when the presence of institutional directors on boards runs from low to 
intermediate levels, they have a negative influence on CSR reporting, but when their 
participation reaches a critical point, the addition of more institutional directors will have a 
positive effect on CSR disclosure. Thus, this shows a U-shaped association, suggesting that 
these directors may play two opposite roles (collusion or monitoring), depending on their 
level of representation on boards. Indeed, when the proportion of institutional directors is 
increasing from low to medium, they prefer to collude with managers, who perceive CSR as 
an extra cost in order to obtain private benefits rather than undertaking monitoring activities 
to promote CSR. Most board members do not consider CSR an essential matter and, 
therefore, if institutional directors were to undertake monitoring activities and challenge board 
members to engage in CSR activities, they would have to bear higher costs to implement 
these activities. Nevertheless, adding more institutional directors beyond a tipping point will 
impact positively on CSR reporting, perhaps because they may share the costs of inducing 
board members and management teams to foster CSR. Furthermore, as the presence of 
institutional directors exceeds this critical point, the other directors may take into account the 
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institutional directors’ preferences, e.g. CSR activities. Therefore, a proportion of institutional 
directors above a certain threshold results in them performing more effective and active roles, 
allowing better control of managers to support CSR. This conclusion is in line with the idea 
that when the presence of certain directors (in our case institutional directors) reaches a 
critical mass on boards, it is likely to affect the behaviour of the board and it is more probable 
that the company will behave in a socially responsible way (Landry et al., 2014).
On the other hand, our findings show institutional directors should be treated as a 
diverse group as their attitudes with respect to CSR do not drive in the same direction. 
Particularly, pressure-sensitive directors do not affect CSR matters, probably because, given 
their short-term orientation, they are not interested in influencing corporate strategy in 
relation to CSR as the benefits of these strategies are derived over the long term. Moreover, 
their business links with the firm will determine their level of support for managers to 
guarantee their commercial relations. Consequently, pressure-sensitive directors will be less 
likely to promote CSR disclosure. The complexity and uncertainty of CSR practices may also 
explain the lack of engagement of pressure-sensitive directors in these activities; they will be 
more inclined to focus on others matters involving less effort and cost.
In contrast, pressure-resistant directors negatively affect CSR disclosure. However, 
beyond a critical point, more pressure-resistant directors on boards will have positive 
repercussions for CSR reporting, suggesting a U-shaped association. These results 
demonstrate that pressure-resistant directors engage in collusion when their presence on 
boards goes from low to intermediate levels, probably because they prefer to support 
managers’ decisions to implement tunnelling activities and attain their own goals. They may 
choose not to support the implementation of CSR, given that the costs of challenging 
executives and other directors to undertake such activities may be greater than the benefits. 
However, when their presence reaches a certain tipping point, pressure-resistant directors will 
display a monitoring role as a higher presence of these directors will allow them to share the 
monitoring costs and control will become more efficient. Thus, it will be more likely that 
pressure-resistant directors encourage changes related to CSR and the behaviour of firms will 
be more responsible, resulting in them gaining the benefits of carrying out such practices. 
This conclusion is in line with the view that pressure-resistant directors are probably keener to 
engage with complex and uncertain issues, such as defining corporate strategies (García-Meca 
et al., 2013) related to CSR disclosure, rather than aligning with managers. 
The presence of institutional directors in Anglo-Saxon countries is less frequent than 
in civil law contexts. Therefore, the findings obtained in this research have significant and 
interesting implications both in the political and academic arenas. The representation of 
independent directors on boards is recommended to improve corporate governance, but 
17
policymakers should also consider the ownership structure when they suggest board 
composition, particularly the presence of directors appointed by institutional investors, as they 
influence corporate governance, especially concerning CSR policies. Institutional directors, as 
supported by the previous literature, do not behave in the same way and can be classified as 
pressure-resistant and pressure-sensitive directors. Thus, the types of institutional directors on 
boards should be considered when policymakers make suggestions regarding board structure, 
given that pressure-resistant directors affect CSR reporting, whereas pressure-sensitive 
directors do not. Another point to be emphasized is the contrasting roles that institutional 
directors and pressure-resistant directors can play, namely, monitoring and collusion, 
depending on the proportion of these directors on boards. Policymakers should take this into 
account as these directors can damage corporate governance if their presence is increasing 
from low to medium levels, reducing CSR reporting, but they will be more likely to disclose 
CSR information if their presence is higher than a critical point. Another implication of our 
analysis is that pressure-sensitive directors do not have the incentives or capabilities to 
participate in and affect the strategic decisions of firms in relation to CSR. Finally, pressure-
sensitive directors do not consider the stakeholders’ interests in firms, in contrast to pressure-
resistant directors, who take into account such interests when their presence on boards 
exceeds a tipping point. Hence, there is a need for more research focused on institutional 
directors taking part in corporate governance mechanisms, such as boards of directors, 
especially in countries where their presence as directors is significant, as new insights into the 
reasons for their participation in corporate governance and their implications are essential. 
This is particularly the case given the two opposite roles (monitoring and collusion) that they 
can play and the fact that their incentives can be different (pressure-resistant/pressure-
sensitive). 
Some limitations should be considered. The data used in this research were obtained 
from a population of Spanish listed firms for the period 2007–2014. Thus, the findings may 
not be applicable to other periods. Apart from institutional directors, other factors that may 
influence CSR have been taken into account. These were chosen based on theory and prior 
evidence, but it may be possible that other unknown aspects might affect CSR reporting. 
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Table 1
Items considered in the CSR index
Social dimension
1. Hiring people at risk of social exclusion
2. Commitment to job creation
3. Training and professional development of employees
4. Flexible labour policies for reconciling work and family life
5. Consideration of employees’ proposals in the management decisions of the company
6. Information on accidents and absenteeism
7. Money earmarked for political parties
8. Investments in social programmes
9. Awards and/or mentions received related to social, ethical and environmental performance
Economic dimension
1. Geographical distribution of markets
2. Geographical distribution of suppliers
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3. Information on responsible purchasing
4. Information on enhancing stable relations, cooperation and mutual benefit with suppliers
5. Information on non-compliance with the terms agreed with suppliers
6. Complete and accurate information about the products and/or services delivered to customers
7. Information on customer complaints
8. Taxes paid to the government by country
Environmental dimension
1. Information on energy, water, etc.
2. Information on the use of renewable energy sources
3. Information on waste generation and emissions
4. Information on the use of waste as inputs for the production process
5. Information on the use of consumables, work in progress products/processed, packaging of low 
environmental impact
6. Information on the commitment to reducing the negative impact of the final product on the environment
7. Incidents/fines related to the environment




0 Firm does not disclose CSR information concerning the items analysed
0.1–0.5 The CSR disclosure of the firm is moderate
0.6–0.9 The CSR disclosure of the firm is considerable
1 The CSR disclosure of the firm concerning the items analysed is complete
Table 3
Main Descriptive Statistics
Panel A. Continuos variables
Variables N Mean Median Std. Dev. Perc. 10 Perc. 90
CSR_REPORTING 864 0.311 0.000 0.359 0.000 84.000%
PINST 864 45.031% 45.455% 28.407% 11.111% 75.000%
PSENSIT 864 7.720% 0.000% 13.909% 0.000% 26.667%
PRESIST 864 36.889% 33.333% 26.751% 0.000% 71.429%
FSIZE 864 13.048 13.057 2.098 10.608 15.683
ROA 864 -1.315% 1.649% 56.101% -16.208% 14.639%
LEV 864 57.557% 54.294% 46.899% 11.059% 91.51%
BDSIZE 864 10.263 10.000 3.914 5.000 16.000
BDMEET 864 9.700 10.000 4.002 5.000 14.000
INDP 864 33.186% 33.333% 18.379% 11.111% 60.000%
Panel B. Dummies variables
Variable 0 % (0) 1 % (1)
REPORT 454 52.546% 410 47.454%
CEO_DUALITY 587 67.940% 277 32.060%
SECT_OE 797 92.245% 67 7.755%
SECT_IC 635 73.495% 229 26.505%
SECT_CO 757 87.616% 107 12.384%
Mean, median, standard deviation, and percentiles of the main variables. 
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Table 4
Results of the regression for institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant directors sit on the 


































































































Estimated coefficients. * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
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Table 5
Results of the regression for institutional, pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant directors sit on the 

































































































Estimated coefficients. * p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
